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Abstract—This paper investigates a critical access control issue
in the Internet of Things (IoT). In particular, we propose a
smart contract-based framework, which consists of multiple
access control contracts (ACCs), one judge contract (JC) and
one register contract (RC), to achieve distributed and trustworthy
access control for IoT systems. Each ACC provides one access
control method for a subject-object pair, and implements both
static access right validation based on predefined policies and
dynamic access right validation by checking the behavior of
the subject. The JC implements a misbehavior-judging method
to facilitate the dynamic validation of the ACCs by receiving
misbehavior reports from the ACCs, judging the misbehavior
and returning the corresponding penalty. The RC registers
the information of the access control and misbehavior-judging
methods as well as their smart contracts, and also provides
functions (e.g., register, update and delete) to manage these
methods. To demonstrate the application of the framework, we
provide a case study in an IoT system with one desktop computer,
one laptop and two Raspberry Pi single-board computers, where
the ACCs, JC and RC are implemented based on the Ethereum
smart contract platform to achieve the access control.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, access control, blockchain,
smart contract.
I. INTRODUCTION
THANKS to the rapid advance of communication andnetworking technologies (e.g., Wi-Fi, Zigbee, Bluetooth),
a growing number of objects (e.g., sensors, actuators, smart
devices) are being connected to the Internet nowadays, leading
to the concept of the Internet of things (IoT) [1], [2]. The
ubiquitous interconnection of physical objects significantly
accelerates data collection, aggregation and sharing in the IoT,
making the IoT one of the most fundamental architectures for
various promising applications such as smart healthcare, intel-
ligent transportation, home automation, etc. [3], [4]. However,
such interconnection may also incur crucial security issues into
IoT systems, because adversaries can intrude into the systems
to gain illegal access to the provided resources (e.g., data,
services, storage units, computing units) by simply deploying
their own or compromising existing IoT devices [5], [6]. Thus,
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access control, which aims to prevent the illegal resource
access from unauthorized entities, has been regarded as an
increasingly vital research issue in the IoT for both academia
and industry [7]–[9].
Traditional IoT access control schemes are mainly built on
top of the well-known access control models including the
role-based access control model (RBAC) [10], the attributed-
based access control model (ABAC) [11] and the capability-
based access control model (CapBAC) [12]. In the RBAC-
based schemes, the access control is based on the roles
(e.g., administer, guest) of subjects (i.e., entities that access
resources) within an organization. By associating the roles
with access rights (e.g., read, write, execute) and assigning the
roles to the subjects, the RBAC-based schemes can establish a
many-to-many relationship between the access rights and the
subjects [13], [14]. The ABAC-based schemes implement the
access control based on policies, which combine various types
of attributes, such as subject attributes, object (i.e., the entity
that holds resources) attributes and environment attributes, etc.,
to define a set of rules expressing under what conditions
access rights can be granted to subjects [15], [16]. In the
CapBAC-based schemes, access rights are granted to subjects
based on the concept of capability, which is a transferable
and unforgeable token of authority (e.g, a key, a ticket), and
describes a set of access rights for each subject [17], [18].
It is notable that, in the above schemes, validating the
access rights of subjects is usually conducted by a centralized
entity, which turns out to be a single point of failure. To
address this issue, distributed CapBAC models have been
proposed recently [19], [20], where the access right validation
is performed by the requested IoT objects themselves rather
than a centralized entity. However, IoT objects are usually
with low capability and thus may be easily compromised by
adversaries, so they cannot be fully trusted as the access right
validation entities. As a result, the distributed CapBAC models
may fail to tackle the access control problem in untrustworthy
IoT environments. Thus, a crucial question arises: how can we
achieve distributed and trustworthy access control in the IoT?
The answer may lie in the emerging blockchain technology,
the key enabler behind modern cryptocurrency systems like
the Bitcoin [21] and Ethereum [22]. The blockchain is initially
created as a distributed and immutable ledger of transactions
for cryptocurrency systems. Thanks to the invention of smart
contracts (executable codes that reside in the blockchain), the
blockchain has now evolved into a promising platform for
developing distributed and trustworthy applications, and has
attracted considerable attentions from researchers in the IoT
2community [23], [24]. Therefore, this paper aims to apply
the smart contract-enabled blockchain technology to achieve
distributed and trustworthy access control for the IoT.
Some initial work has been done on the blockchain-based
access control. The authors in [25] considered the access
control issue in an IoT network with service providers, cloud
storage, user devices and smart homes, each containing a
miner and multiple IoT devices. Each home miner maintains
a local private blockchain with a policy header storing access
control policies to control all the access requests related
to the home, i.e., internal, incoming and outgoing requests.
However, the authors eliminated the critical proof-of-work
process [26] in the blockchain technology, resulting in an
untrustworthy access control scheme. Notice that the main
purpose of the blockchain in [25] is to serve as a distributed
and immutable storage for access control policies, whereas the
computing capability of the blockchain was largely wasted.
The idea of using the blockchain to only store access control
policies has also been adopted in [27], [28]. Recently, the
computing capability of the blockchain has been exploited in
[29] for access control, where the blockchain plays the role
of a decentralized access control manager. The authors used
access tokens to represent access rights and the tokens can
be delivered from one peer to another through transactions.
When delivering a token, the sender embeds access control
policies into the locking scripts of the transaction output. The
receiver of the token must unlock the locking scripts to prove
the possession of the token (i.e., the access rights to a certain
resource). Using this scheme, a peer can be granted access
rights by receiving a token, grant access rights to another
subject by delivering a token, and access an object by spending
a token. Although using locking scripts for access control is
an excellent idea, the computing capability of locking scripts
is significantly limited. Different from [29], this paper utilizes
smart contracts to provide a much higher computing capability
for achieving various access control methods. Notice that the
idea of using smart contracts for access control has been
adopted in [30], [31], where, different from this paper, the
main purpose of the smart contracts is to manage data records.
To address the limitations of the above works, this paper
proposes a smart contract-based access control framework,
which consists of multiple access control contracts (ACCs),
one judge contract (JC) and one register contract (RC), to
achieve distributed and trustworthy access control for IoT sys-
tems. In the framework, each ACC provides one access control
method for a subject-object pair, which implements both static
access right validation based on predefined access control
policies and dynamic access right validation by checking the
behavior of the subject. The ACCs also provide functions for
adding, updating and deleting access control policies. Once
called by a subject for access control, the ACC will be run
and verified by most participants in the system, ensuring the
trustworthiness of the access control. To facilitate the dynamic
validation of the ACCs, the JC provides a misbehavior-
judging method, which receives misbehavior reports about the
subjects from the ACCs, judges the misbehavior and returns
the corresponding penalty. To manage the access control and
misbehavior-judgingmethods, the RC registers the information
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the considered IoT system.
(e.g., name, subject, object, smart contract) of the methods and
also provides functions to register a new method and update or
delete an existing method. To demonstrate the application of
the framework, we provide a case study, in which we employ
the Ethereum smart contract platform to implement the ACCs,
JC and RC for the access control in a IoT system with one
desktop computer, one laptop and two Raspberry Pi single-
board computers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the IoT system considered in this paper and Section
III introduces the underlying smart contract platform for our
access control framework. We introduce the distributed smart
contract-based framework in Section IV and provide a case
study for the proposed framework in Section V. Finally,
Section VI concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
As illustrated in Fig. 1, the IoT system considered in this
paper consists of a large number of servers, storage devices,
IoT gateways and user devices, which are connected together
through a peer-to-peer (P2P) network. Also present in the
system are numerous IoT devices (e.g., sensors and actuators),
which are connected to the P2P network via the IoT gateways.
The main roles of the peers are explained as follows.
• Server: A server is a device or a cluster of devices that
can interact with the IoT devices and storage devices
to provide a variety of services (e.g., smart home) for
users. Interactions between the servers and other peers
(e.g., IoT devices, storage devices) include collecting
environmental data from the sensors, sending commands
to the actuators to perform some operation, querying data
from or storing data to the storage devices, etc.
• Storage device: A storage device can store data for other
peers of the system, like the servers, sensors and users.
Various data can be stored on the storage devices, like
the application data of the servers, environmental data
gathered by the sensors, user profiles, etc.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of a blockchain.
• User device: A user device is a device (e.g., PCs, laptops,
smart phones) through which users can enjoy the services
(e.g., checking the current temperature of his/her own
house) provided by the servers and read data from or
write data to the storage devices.
• IoT gateway: Each IoT gateway connects a cluster of
IoT devices to the P2P network via short-range commu-
nication technologies like Bluetooth, Wi-Fi and Zigbee,
and serves as the service agent for these IoT devices at
the same time.
• IoT device: The IoT devices in the system mainly include
sensors, which can perceive environmental data (e.g.,
temperature) and send these data to the servers or storage
devices for further use, and actuators, which can perform
some operations (e.g., turning on the air conditioner) once
receiving a command from users.
In typical IoT applications, each peer may have some resources
(e.g., services, data, storage space) that are needed by the
other peers. Thus, access control must be implemented by all
resource owners to prevent unauthorized use of their resources.
For example, a server must be able to block the access requests
from users who has not signed up, or the access requests
from signed-up users for some services that they have not
subscribed. To prevent illegal use of its storage space and data,
a storage device must be able to restrict the access requests
from unauthorized peers for querying data or storing data.
An IoT device must be able to deny the unauthorized access
requests for retrieving its data or controlling its actuators.
The aim of this paper is to address the critical access
control issue for the above IoT system. In particular, we will
propose an access control framework based on smart contracts
to implement distributed and trustworthy access control.
III. SMART CONTRACT PLATFORM
A. Ethereum Platform
The proposed framework is based on the Ethereum smart
contract platform [22], through which each peer of the system
can implement access control for its resources. The main
elements of the Ethereum platform are briefly introduced as
follows. For a detailed introduction to the Ethereum platform,
please refer to [32].
• Account/Address: Ethereum has two types of accounts:
externally controlled accounts and contract accounts, both
identified by a 20-byte address. We refer to the former
simply as accounts and the latter as smart contracts or
contracts throughout this paper.
• Smart contract: A smart contract or contract is regarded
as a special account that has associated code (i.e., its
functions) and data (i.e., its state) [33]. In general, a
smart contract is compiled into a piece of bytecode in an
Ethereum-specific binary format (i.e., Ethereum Virtual
Machine bytecode) and deployed by an account to a
global database known as blockchain. A smart contract
usually provides many functions or application binary
interfaces (ABIs) that can be used to interact with it.
These ABIs can be executed by sending a transaction
from an account or a message from another contract. They
can also be executed by simply invoking the call function
without sending transactions and messages. Notice that
only the former approach can modify the data (or state)
of the contract.
• Transaction and Message: A transaction is a data pack-
age signed and sent by an account to transfer some ether
(Ethereum’s native token) to another account. In addition
to transferring ether, a transaction can also be sent with
some parameters to execute the ABIs of a contract. A
message is like a transaction, but it is sent by a contract
instead of an account to run the associated ABIs of
another contract.
• Blockchain: Like most platforms such as Bitcoin,
Ethereum also has a blockchain, which contains blocks
of transactions and smart contracts with each block
containing the hash of its previous block, as illustrated in
Fig. 2. Every node connected to the network may have
a local copy of the blockchain, and help maintain and
update the blockchain by including new blocks.
• Mining: Mining is a process that includes new blocks of
transactions and contracts into the blockchain. The nodes
performing this task are called miners. In one mining
around, each miner constructs a block of newly generated
transactions and contracts, and executes the proof-of-
work consensus algorithm, where the miners repeatedly
guesses random numbers to solve an extremely difficult
cryptographic puzzle problem related to its block until
one of them wins. The winning miner then broadcasts its
block to the other nodes in the network to validate the
block. For the block validation, each node not only checks
the formats of the transactions and contracts in the block,
but also executes the ABIs called by these transactions
in its local EVM. If the formats of the transactions
and contracts as well as the results of the called ABIs
are valid, the other nodes will include the new block
into its local blockchain; otherwise, they will discard
the block. Through mining, the whole system reaches
a common tamper-resistant consensus on the blockchain
and no participant can deceive the others by wrongly
executing the ABIs, as long as it controls no more than
half of the computing power of the system. This is the key
to achieving trustworthy access control for IoT systems.
Notice that the mining in current implementation of the
Ethereum is based on the concept of proof-of-work, while
a novel proof-of-stake consensus algorithm [34], which
depends on the economic stake of miners instead of
their computing computing power, will be used in future
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implementation of Ethereum.
B. System Configurations
To apply the Ethereum platform in our access control frame-
work, we need to make the following basic configurations to
the system.
• Each peer must be associated with an Ethereum account
to represent itself in the system. Using the account, each
peer can claim the deployment of a smart contract and
identify itself during the access control.
• The Ethereum client can be run at all peers in the
system except for IoT devices, due to the limited energy
and computing power of IoT devices. All clients are
assumed synchronized on the same block. Using the
client, each peer except for IoT devices can directly
interact with the blockchain to deploy smart contracts
and send transactions to run the ABIs of smart contracts.
These peers can also function as miners to conduct the
mining task for the system.
• As IoT devices has no Ethereum clients, the IoT gateways
act as agents for their local IoT devices to conduct access
control for the resources of the IoT devices. To achieve
this goal, each gateway stores the accounts of its local
IoT devices and uses these accounts to sign transactions
for deploying and running smart contracts on behalf of
its local IoT devices. We assume gateways are physically
accessible and thus unlikely to be compromised, so they
can be trusted as the agents.
IV. ACCESS CONTROL FRAMEWORK
This section presents the smart contract-based distributed
access control framework. We first introduce the system of
smart contracts in the framework and then explain the main
functions provided by the framework.
A. Smart Contract System
As illustrated in Fig. 3, the proposed framework consists
of multiple access control contracts (ACCs), each of which
implements the access control for a pair of peers, one judge
TABLE I
ILLUSTRATION OF POLICY LIST.
Resource Action Permission ToLR
file A read allow 2017-12-11 16:19
file A write deny 2017-12-12 20:34
Program A execute deny 2017-12-11 16:19
... ... ... ...
contract (JC), which receives the misbehavior report of a
peer from an ACC, judges the misbehavior and determines
the corresponding penalty, and one register contract (RC),
which stores the information of the JC and ACCs and provide
functions to manage these contracts. Each of the contracts is
introduced as follows.
1) Access control contract (ACC): An ACC (e.g., ACC
1, ACC 2, ACC 3 in Fig. 3) is deployed by a peer (object)
who wants to control the access requests from another peer
(subject). We assume that the subject-object pair can agree
on multiple access control methods, and each method is
implemented by one ACC. As a result, one subject-object pair
can be associated with multiple ACCs, but one ACC can be
associated with one and only one subject-object pair. In this
framework, to control the access requests from the subject,
each ACC implements not only static access right validation
by checking predefined policies but also dynamic validation
by checking the behavior of the subject.
An example of the ACC is given as follows. In this example,
to achieve the access control, the ACC maintains a policy list
as illustrated in Table I, in which each row corresponds to the
policy defined on a certain (resource, action) pair. The basic
fields of each row are:
• Resource: the resource for which the policy is defined,
such as a file, a computing unit and a storage unit, etc.;
• Action: the action that is performed on the resource, such
as read, write, execute, etc.;
• Permission: the static permission predefined on the action,
such as allow, deny, etc.; and
• Time of last request (ToLR): the time of the last access
request from the subject.
The Permission field can be used for static validation and the
ToLR can be used for dynamic validation, such as detecting
the misbehavior that the subject sends access requests too
frequently in a short period of time.
To record the misbehavior that the subject has exhibited on
a certain resource as well as the corresponding penalty, the
ACC also maintains a misbehavior list for each resource (as
illustrated in Table II), where each row has the following basic
fields:
• Misbehavior: the misbehavior of the subject on this
resource, such as too frequent request in a short period
of time, etc.;
• Time: the time when the misbehavior is exhibited; and
• Penalty: the penalty on the subject for its misbehavior,
such as blocking its access requests for a certain period
of time, etc.;
The Misbehavior field may also describe the details of the
misbehavior to facilitate the misbehavior judging at the JC.
5TABLE II
ILLUSTRATION OF MISBEHAVIOR LIST FOR EACH RESOURCE.
Misbehavior Time Penalty
Too frequent access 2017-12-11 16:19 blocked for 2 hours
Too frequent access 2017-12-12 20:34 blocked for 4 hours
... ... ...
The ACC also provides the following main ABIs to manage
the policies and implement the access control.
• policyAdd(): This ABI receives the information of a new
access control policy and adds the information to the
policy list.
• policyUpdate(): This ABI receives the information of a
policy that needs to be updated and updates the policy.
• policyDelete(): This ABI receives the identification infor-
mation of a policy and deletes the policy.
• accessControl(): This ABI receives the information re-
quired for access control and returns the access result
and penalty. This ABI implements both the static and
dynamic validation. When the subject calls (by sending
a transaction) this ABI to authorize its current access
request, both the static and dynamic validation processes
will start to check the validity of the request. Once a
possible misbehavior is detected, the ACC reports it to the
JC by sending a message to execute the misbehaviorJudge
ABI of the JC, receives a penalty decision on the mis-
behavior from the JC and takes countermeasures based
on the penalty decision. The access request is authorized
if and only if it successfully passes both the static and
dynamic validation processes.
• setJC(): In order for the ACC to execute the ABI of the
JC, the ACC needs to keep an instance of the JC, so this
ABI is to receive the address of the JC and set the JC
instance.
• deleteACC(): This ABI performs the selfdestruct opera-
tion to remove the code and storage of the ACC from
the blockchain [33], such that the ACC can no longer be
available.
Notice that only the creator of the ACC can add a new policy,
update or delete an existing policy, set the JC and delete the
ACC. Thus, permission must be carefully considered in the
implementation of the ABIs.
2) Judge contract (JC): The JC implements a misbehavior-
judging method, which judges the misbehavior of the subject
and determines the corresponding penalty, when receiving a
potential misbehavior report from an ACC, as illustrated in
Fig. 3. The penalty can be based on the misbehavior history
of the subject, so the JC may need to keep a record of
the misbehavior history of all subjects. After determining
the penalty, the JC returns the decision to the ACC for
further operation. Here, we give an example of the JC, which
maintains a misbehavior list for each subject who has behaved
abnormally, as illustrated in Fig. 4. The fields of each record
include:
• Object: the peer who suffered from the misbehavior;
• Misbehavior: the details of the misbehavior;
User A Sensor B Server C… …
Misbehavior Records
… …… … … …… …
Object Misbehavior Time Penalty
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Fig. 4. Illustration of misbehavior records.
• Time: the time when the misbehavior is exhibited; and
• Penalty: the penalty imposed on the misbehavior.
The JC also provides the following main ABIs for judging
misbehavior, determining the penalty and managing the JC.
• misbehaviorJudge(): This ABI can be run by any ACC
to report the misbehavior of a subject to the JC. After
receiving the report, this ABI judges the misbehavior
of the subject, determines the penalty on the subject
based on the misbehavior history of the subject and
returns the penalty decision to the ACC that reported
the misbehavior. This ABI also adds a new misbehavior
record to the misbehavior list of the subject.
• deleteJC(): This ABI performs the selfdestruct operation
to delete the JC.
3) Register contract (RC): The main role of the RC in
the system is to manage the access control and misbehavior-
judging methods. To achieve this goal, the RC maintains a
lookup table, which registers the required information to find
and execute all the methods. An example of the lookup table
is given in Table III, in which each row contains the following
information of a method:
• MethodName: the name of the method;
• Subject: the subject of the corresponding subject-object
pair of the method;
• Object: the object of the corresponding subject-object pair
of the method;
• ScName: the name of the corresponding smart contract
implementing this method;
• Creator: the peer who created and deployed the contract;
• ScAddress: the address of the smart contract; and
• ABI: the ABIs provided by the contract.
For the JC, the Subject and Object fields are left blank. In
general, the object is the creator of the ACC as well as the
creator of the access control method. Notice that for the case
where the object is an IoT device, the creator is the local
gateway, i.e., the agent for deploying contracts and sending
transactions for the IoT device.
With the help of the lookup table, the RC provides the
following main ABIs to mange these methods.
6TABLE III
ILLUSTRATION OF LOOKUP TABLE.
MethodName Subject Object ScName Creator ScAddress ABI
Method 1 Server A Sensor B ACC 1 Sensor B 0xca35b7d915458ef540ade6068dfe2f44e8fa733c accessControl(),...
Method 2 Server A Sensor B ACC 2 Sensor B 0xab072c469475346532bf47aea86df61761049565 accessControl(),...
Method 3 Sensor B Server A ACC 3 Server A 0xb51f6d86d4c998531056a501344060fbafc32a48 accessControl(),...
JC Judge 0x3f23c7b929cced4191ef6064ffcb33902ea1d92b misbehaviorJudge()...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
• methodRegister(): This ABI receives the information of a
new method and registers the information into the lookup
table.
• methodUpdate(): This ABI receives the information of an
existing method that needs to be updated and update the
information, especially the fields of ScAddress and ABI.
• methodDelete(): This ABI receives the MethodName of a
method and deletes the method from the lookup table.
• getContract(): This ABI receives the MethodName of a
method and returns the address and ABIs of the contract
(i.e., the ACCs and JC) of the method.
Notice that only the creator of the method can register, update
and delete the method.
B. Main Functions of the Framework
With the help of the ACC, JC and RC smart contracts, the
framework can provide many functions to facilitate the access
control of the IoT system. These functions mainly include
registering, updating and deleting an access control method;
registering and updating the misbehavior-judging method;
adding, updating and deleting a policy of an ACC; and the
access control for a subject-object pair. The process of each
function is explained as follows.
1) Registering a new access control method: A subject-
object pair can agree on a new access control method, which
is registered by the creator (i.e., the object) of the method
through the following steps.
• Step 1: Create (i.e., write and compile) an ACC for the
new method.
• Step 2: Send a transaction to deploy the newly created
ACC onto the blockchain.
• Step 3: Send a transaction to call the methodRegister ABI
of the RC to register the required information of the new
ACC in the lookup table of the RC.
Registering the misbehavior-juding method follows the same
steps as above.
2) Updating an existing access control method: A subject-
object pair can agree on updating an existing access control
method, which is conducted by the creator of the method
through the following steps.
• Step 1: Create a new ACC, which is used to replace the
old one.
• Step 2: Send a transaction to deploy the newly created
ACC onto the blockchain.
• Step 3: Send a transaction to run the methodUpdate ABI
of the RC to update the ACC-related fields of the method,
such as the ScName, ScAddress, ABI, etc..
• Step 4: Send a transaction to run the deleteACC ABI of
the old ACC to destruct it.
Updating the misbehavior-juding method follows the same
steps as above.
3) Deleting an existing access control method: A subject-
object pair can agree on deleting an existing access control
method, which is conducted by the creator of the method
through the following steps.
• Step 1: Send a transaction to run the methodDelete ABI
of the RC to delete the information of the existing method
from the lookup table.
• Step 2: Send a transaction to run the deleteACC ABI of
the ACC of the method.
4) Adding, updating and deleting a policy: A subject-
object can agree on adding an access control policy for a
newly-deployed resource, which is conducted by the creator of
the method through sending a transaction to call the policyAdd
ABI of the corresponding ACC. Similarly, the creator can send
a transaction to call the policyUpdate (resp. policyDelete) ABI
of the ACC to update (resp. delete) an existing policy of the
access control method.
5) Access control: The ACC for the access control between
a subject-object pair can be called by either the subject or
the object. We assume that both the subject and object know
the names of all the available methods for the access control
between them. The illustration of the case where the ACC is
called by the subject is given in Fig. 5a, where a server (the
subject) wants to access the resource of an IoT device (the
object). To complete the access control, the following steps
are executed:
• Step 1: The server calls the getContract ABI of the RC
to retrieve the ACC (e.g., the ACC 2 in Fig. 5a) for the
access control.
• Step 2: The RC returns the address and ABI of the ACC
to the server.
• Step 3: The server sends a transaction, which contains
the required information for access control, to call the
accessControl ABI of the ACC. This transaction will be
encapsulated in a new block and the accessControl ABI
will not be executed until the new block is mined and
included in the blockchain by some miner.
• Step 4: During the access control process, the ACC will
send a message to call the misbehaviorJudge ABI of
the JC, if some potential misbehavior of the subject is
detected.
• Step 5: Once the misbehaviorJudgeABI completes juding
the misbehavior and determining the penalty, it will return
the penalty to the ACC.
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Fig. 5. Illustration of access control.
• Step 6: Finally, the access result will be returned to both
the subject and object, after the access control process
finishes.
Since all miners will reach a consensus on the result of the
access control through mining, so no miners can tamper with
the access control process. As the agent of the IoT device,
the local gateway informs the IoT device the real-time status
of the access control, such as the arrival of access requests
and the access results, via secure local interactions. Fig. 5b
illustrates the case where the ACC is called by the object.
The main difference between the access control in Fig. 5b
and that in Fig. 5a is that the access request of the subject
(resp. the access result) in Fig. 5b is forwarded by the object
rather than being directly sent to the accessControl ABI of the
ACC (resp. the subject).
V. CASE STUDY
This section provides a case study to demonstrate the appli-
cation of the proposed framework for distributed access control
in the IoT. We first introduce the hardware and software
used in the study and then present how the access control is
implemented based on the framework. Finally, we show some
experiment results.
Fig. 6. Hardware used in the case study.
A. Hardware and Software
We considered a case with one desktop computer (Dell
Inspiron 3650), one laptop (MacBook Pro) and two single-
board computers (Raspberriy Pi 3 Model B), as shown in Fig.
6. The specifications of these devices are listed in Table IV.
The desktop and laptop correspond to the user devices in the
system and the single-board computers correspond to the local
gateways. We considered the access control issue between the
single-board computers, of which one serves as the subject (or
the agent of the subject) and the other severs as the object (or
the agent of the object).
On each device, a geth client [35] (a command line interface
implemented in the Go language) was installed to transform
the device into an Ethereum node. With the geth clients, we
created an Ethereum account for each node and configured
these nodes to form a private blockchain network (as illustrated
in Fig. 7), where the desktop computer and the laptop play the
roles of miners due to their relatively large computing and
storage capability, and the single-board computers function
as lightweight Ethereum nodes that deploy ACCs and send
transactions for access control.
For writing and compiling the ACC at the object side,
we utilized the Remix integrated development environment
(IDE) [36], which is a browser-based IDE for Solidity (i.e.,
the programming language for writing smart contracts) [37].
In addition, we adopted the web3.js [38] (i.e., the official
Ethereum JavaScript API) at the object side to interact with
the corresponding geth client through HTTP connections for
deploying the compiled ACC and also monitoring the states of
the ACC ( i.e., the results of the access control). The web3.js
was also installed at the subject side to interact with the geth
for sending access requests to the ACC via transactions and
also receiving the access control results from the ACC.
B. Implementation
The implementation of the ACC, RC and JC is based on
the examples in Section IV-A.
1) ACC: In this implementation, we defined a simple
misbehavior, which is sending access requests too frequently in
a short period of time. To help characterize the misbehavior,
we added the following fields to the rows (i.e., policies) in
Table I:
• minInterval: the minimum allowable time interval be-
tween two successive requests. If the time interval be-
tween two successive requests is less than or equal to
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SPECIFICATIONS OF DEVICES.
Device CPU Operating System Memory Hard Disk
Dell Inspiron 3650 Intel Core i7-6700, 3.40GHz Windows 10 Home (64 bit) 16GB 2TB
MacBook Pro Intel Core i5, 2GHz macOS Sierra (Version 10.12.6) 8GB 256GB
Raspberry Pi 3 Model B quad-core ARM Cortex A53, 1.2GHz Raspbian GNU/Linux 8 (jessie) 1GB SDRAM 16GB (microSD card)
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Fig. 7. Software used in the case study.
minInterval, the later request will be treated as a frequent
request.
• NoFR: the number of frequent requests in a short time
period.
• threshold: the threshold on the NoFR. If the NoFR is
larger than or equal to the threshold, the ACC judges
that a misbehavior occurs.
As the penalty for the misbehavior, the access requests from
the subject will be blocked for a certain time period. We
introduced a variable timeOfUnblock for each resource to
represent the time until when requests are blocked, which is
set to 0 when the requests are unblocked. We used a struct
to store the fields of a policy and applied a two-dimensional
mapping from the fields of resource (primary key) and action
(secondary key) to this struct to construct the policy list.
The ACC also contains a JC instance, through which the
misbehaviorJudge ABI of the JC can be run by the ACC.
Based on the above fields and variables, we designed the
accessControl ABI as in Algorithm 1, which receives the
inputs of resource, action and time (i.e., when the request
is sent), and returns the access result and penalty. The static
validation is from Line 7 to Line 11 and the dynamic validation
is from Line 12 to Line 23. The event returnResult(result,
penalty) in Line 28 is used to return the access result and
penalty to both the subjects and objects. For the detailed
Algorithm 1 accessControl ABI
Input: resource, action, time
Output: result, penalty
Require: policyCheck ← false, behaviorCheck ← true,
penalty ← 0, JC instance judge, policy list policies,
timeofUnblock of resource.
1: if This request is from the subject then
2: p ← policies[resource][action].
3: if timeofUnblock ≤ time then
4: if timeofUnblock > 0 then
5: p.NoFR ← 0, p.ToLR ← 0, timeofUnblock ← 0.
6: end if
7: if p.policy = ”allow” then
8: policyCheck ← true.
9: else
10: policyCheck ← false.
11: end if
12: if time − p.ToLR ≤ p.minInterval then
13: p.NoFR ← p.NoFR + 1.
14: if p.NoFR ≥ p.threshold then
15: Detect a misbehavior msb.
16: behaviorCheck ← false.
17: penalty ← judge.misbehaviorJudge(subject,
msb).
18: timeofUnblock ← time + penalty.
19: Push msb into the misbehavior list of resource.
20: end if
21: else
22: p.NoFR ← 0.
23: end if
24: end if
25: p.ToLR ← time.
26: end if
27: result ← policyCheck and behaviorCheck.
28: Trigger event returnResult(result, penalty).
implementation of the ACC, please refer to [39].
2) RC: The key issue in the implementation of the RC is
to construct the loopup table as shown in Table III. Like the
construction of policy list for the ACC, we used a struct to
store the information of each method and applied a mapping
from the field of MethodName to this struct to construct the
loopup table.
3) JC: In the implementation of the JC, we used a dynamic
array to store the misbehavior records of a subject. We con-
sidered a simple misbehavior judging method, which treats all
potential misbehavior received from the ACC as misbehavior.
When receiving a misbehavior report of a subject from the
ACC, the misbehaviorReport ABI pushes the misbehavior into
9the misbehavior record array of the subject and then uses the
following function to determine the corresponding penalty:
penalty = (base)⌊ℓ/interval⌋, (1)
where ℓ is the number of misbehavior that the subject has
exhibited (i.e., the length of the misbehavior record array of the
subject), and base and interval are parameters that determine
how the penalty changes with ℓ. Notice that base and interval
are initialized when the JC is deployed.
4) JavaScripts at the subject and object: The access control
in this study is implemented based on the case in Fig. 5a,
where the ACC is called by the subject and the result is
returned to both sides. To implement the access control, we
created two JavaScripts (one at the subject and the other at
the object) using the web3.js to interact with the JC and ACC.
As shown in Algorithm 2, the JavaScript at the subject side
first retrieves the address addr and ABI abi of the ACC from
the RC (Line 1 - Line 3) and then sends a transaction that
contains the access request information (resource, action, time)
to run the accessControl ABI of the ACC for access control
(Line 4 - Line 5). Finally, the JavaScript watches the event
returnResult() returned from the accessControl ABI to retrieve
the access result (Line 6 - Line 11).
Algorithm 2 Access Request JavaScript
Input: resource, action, time
Output: result, penalty
1: Create a RC instance register.
2: Specify the access control method name method.
3: (addr, abi)← register.getContract(method).
4: Create an ACC instance acc with addr, abi.
5: Send a transaction containing parameters (resource, ac-
tion, time) to the accessControl ABI of acc.
6: while ture do
7: if Event returnResult() is captured then
8: (result, penalty) ← returnResult().
9: break.
10: end if
11: end while
12: return result, penalty
The JavaScript at the object side is illustrated in Algorithm
3), which uses the same statements (Line 1 - Line 3) to retrieve
the address and ABI of the ACC from the RC and infinitely
watches the returnResult() events from the ACC to know who
wants to access which resource at what time, and what the
corresponding result and penalty are (Line 4 - Line 10).
C. Experiments
Our source code for the ACC, JC, RC and JavaScripts of
the case study is now available at [39]. Based on the code, the
hardware and software, we conducted experiments to show
the feasibility of the framework for access control. We added
a policy to the ACC with minInterval set to 100 seconds and
threshold set to 2. We also set the base and interval in the
JC to 2 and 3, respectively. Fig. 8 shows the access results
displayed by the JavaScripts at the object (Fig. 8a) and subject
Algorithm 3 Access Monitor JavaScript
1: Create a RC instance register.
2: Specify the access control method name method.
3: (addr, abi)← register.getContract(method).
4: Create an ACC instance acc with addr, abi.
5: while ture do
6: if Event returnResult() is captured then
7: (result, penalty) ← returnResult().
8: Display result, penalty.
9: end if
10: end while
(a) Results at the object.
(b) Results at the subject.
Fig. 8. Access results after misbehavior occurring once.
(Fig. 8b), when the subject exhibited the misbehavior for the
first time. Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 show the access results, when
the subject exhibited the misbehavior for three times and six
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(a) Results at the object.
(b) Results at the subject.
Fig. 9. Access results after misbehavior occurring for three times.
times, respectively. We can see that the request of the subject
is blocked for 1, 2 and 4 minutes in Fig. 8, Fig. 9 and Fig. 10,
respectively, which is consistent with the penalty determining
equation in (1).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigated the access control issue in the IoT,
for which we proposed a smart contract-based framework
to implement distributed and trustworthy access control. The
framework includes multiple access control contracts (ACCs)
for access control between multiple subject-object pairs in the
system, one judge contract (JC) for judging the misbehavior
of the subjects during the access control, and one register
contract (RC) for managing the ACCs and JC. A case study
was also provided for the access control in a IoT system
with one desktop computer, one laptop and two Raspberry
Pi single-board computers. The case study demonstrated the
feasibility of the proposed framework in achieving distributed
and trustworthy access control for the IoT.
REFERENCES
[1] I. Yaqoob, E. Ahmed, I. A. T. Hashem, A. I. A. Ahmed, A. Gani,
M. Imran, and M. Guizani, “Internet of things architecture: Recent
advances, taxonomy, requirements, and open challenges,” IEEE Wireless
Commun., vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 10–16, 2017.
[2] M. R. Palattella, M. Dohler, A. Grieco, G. Rizzo, J. Torsner, T. Engel,
and L. Ladid, “Internet of things in the 5g era: Enablers, architecture,
and business models,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 34, no. 3, pp.
510–527, 2016.
(a) Results at the object.
(b) Results at the subject.
Fig. 10. Access results after misbehavior occurring for six times.
[3] L. D. Xu, W. He, and S. Li, “Internet of things in industries: A survey,”
IEEE Trans. Ind. Informat., vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 2233–2243, 2014.
[4] A. Al-Fuqaha, M. Guizani, M. Mohammadi, M. Aledhari, and
M. Ayyash, “Internet of things: A survey on enabling technologies,
protocols, and applications,” IEEE Commun. Surveys Tuts., vol. 17, no. 4,
pp. 2347–2376, 2015.
[5] C. J. DOrazio, K. K. R. Choo, and L. T. Yang, “Data exfiltration from
internet of things devices: ios devices as case studies,” IEEE Internet
Things J., vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 524–535, 2017.
[6] E. Bertino and N. Islam, “Botnets and internet of things security,”
Computer, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 76–79, Feb. 2017. [Online]. Available:
doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/MC.2017.62
[7] S. Sicari, A. Rizzardi, L. A. Grieco, and A. Coen-Porisini, “Security,
privacy and trust in internet of things: The road ahead,” Computer
Networks, vol. 76, pp. 146–164, 2015.
[8] J. Singh, T. Pasquier, J. Bacon, H. Ko, and D. Eyers, “Twenty security
considerations for cloud-supported internet of things,” IEEE Internet
Things J., vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 269–284, June 2016.
[9] A. Ouaddah, H. Mousannif, A. A. Elkalam, and A. A. Ouahman, “Access
control in the internet of things: Big challenges and new opportunities,”
Computer Networks, vol. 112, pp. 237 – 262, 2017. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1389128616303735
[10] R. S. Sandhu, E. J. Coyne, H. L. Feinstein, and C. E. Youman, “Role-
based access control models,” Computer, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 38–47, 1996.
[11] V. C. Hu, D. R. Kuhn, and D. F. Ferraiolo, “Attribute-based access
control,” Computer, vol. 48, no. 2, pp. 85–88, 2015.
[12] R. S. Sandhu and P. Samarati, “Access control: principle and practice,”
IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 32, no. 9, pp. 40–48, 1994.
[13] A. Yavari, A. S. Panah, D. Georgakopoulos, P. P. Jayaraman, and
R. v. Schyndel, “Scalable role-based data disclosure control for the
internet of things,” in 2017 IEEE 37th International Conference on
Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS), June 2017, pp. 2226–2233.
[14] Q. Liu, H. Zhang, J. Wan, and X. Chen, “An access control model for
resource sharing based on the role-based access control intended for
multi-domain manufacturing internet of things,” IEEE Access, vol. 5,
pp. 7001–7011, 2017.
11
[15] N. Ye, Y. Zhu, R.-c. Wang, R. Malekian, and L. Qiao-min, “An efficient
authentication and access control scheme for perception layer of internet
of things,” Applied Mathematics & Information Sciences, vol. 8, no. 4,
p. 1617, 2014.
[16] S. Bhatt, F. Patwa, and R. Sandhu, “Access control model for aws
internet of things,” in International Conference on Network and System
Security. Springer, 2017, pp. 721–736.
[17] S. Gusmeroli, S. Piccione, and D. Rotondi, “A capability-based security
approach to manage access control in the internet of things,” Mathemat-
ical and Computer Modelling, vol. 58, no. 5-6, pp. 1189–1205, 2013.
[18] P. N. Mahalle, B. Anggorojati, N. R. Prasad, R. Prasad et al., “Identity
authentication and capability based access control (iacac) for the internet
of things,” Journal of Cyber Security and Mobility, vol. 1, no. 4, pp.
309–348, 2013.
[19] J. L. Hernndez-Ramos, M. P. Pawlowski, A. J. Jara, A. F. Skarmeta,
and L. Ladid, “Toward a lightweight authentication and authorization
framework for smart objects,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 33,
no. 4, pp. 690–702, 2015.
[20] D. Hussein, E. Bertin, and V. Frey, “A community-driven access control
approach in distributed iot environments,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 55,
no. 3, pp. 146–153, March 2017.
[21] Bitcoin - open source p2p money. [Online]. Available:
https://bitcoin.org/en/
[22] Ethereum smart contract platform. [Online]. Available:
https://www.ethereum.org/
[23] K. Christidis and M. Devetsikiotis, “Blockchains and smart contracts for
the internet of things,” IEEE Access, vol. 4, pp. 2292–2303, 2016.
[24] N. Kshetri, “Can blockchain strengthen the internet of things?” IT
Professional, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 68–72, 2017.
[25] A. Dorri, S. S. Kanhere, R. Jurdak, and P. Gauravaram, “Blockchain for
iot security and privacy: The case study of a smart home,” in 2017 IEEE
International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications
Workshops (PerCom Workshops), March 2017, pp. 618–623.
[26] S. Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system,” 2008.
[27] G. Zyskind, O. Nathan, and A. . Pentland, “Decentralizing privacy:
Using blockchain to protect personal data,” in 2015 IEEE Security and
Privacy Workshops, May 2015, pp. 180–184.
[28] D. D. F. Maesa, P. Mori, and L. Ricci, “Blockchain based access
control,” in IFIP International Conference on Distributed Applications
and Interoperable Systems. Springer, 2017, pp. 206–220.
[29] A. Ouaddah, A. Abou Elkalam, and A. Ait Ouahman, “Fairaccess: a new
blockchain-based access control framework for the internet of things,”
Security and Communication Networks, vol. 9, no. 18, pp. 5943–5964,
2016.
[30] A. Azaria, A. Ekblaw, T. Vieira, and A. Lippman, “Medrec: Using
blockchain for medical data access and permission management,” in
Open and Big Data (OBD), International Conference on. IEEE, 2016,
pp. 25–30.
[31] A. Ramachandran, D. Kantarcioglu et al., “Using blockchain and smart
contracts for secure data provenance management,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1709.10000, 2017.
[32] An introduction to ethereum platform. [Online]. Available:
http://ethdocs.org/en/latest/introduction/what-is-ethereum.html
[33] An introduction to ethereum smart contracts. [Online]. Available:
http://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/develop/introduction-to-smart-contracts.html
[34] Proof-of-stake. [Online]. Available:
https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Proof-of-Stake-FAQ
[35] Geth client for building private blockchain networks. [Online].
Available: https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/wiki/geth
[36] Remix ide for ethereum smart contract programming. [Online].
Available: https://remix.ethereum.org/
[37] Solidity - a contract-oriented, high-level language
for implementing smart contract. [Online]. Available:
https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/develop/
[38] Web3 javascript api to interact with ethereum nodes. [Online].
Available: https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/JavaScript-API
[39] Implement access control in a simple iot system using ethereum smart
contrats. [Online]. Available: http://mdlval.blogspot.jp/
